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Executive Summary 
 Even as home sales prices increase in some parts of New York City and a 
loud and increasing buzz around a supposedly revitalized housing market ensues, 
there continue to be over 60,000 homeowners in crisis.
1
  These families, 
concentrated in predominantly African-American and Latino low- and moderate-
income neighborhoods, continue to live in a precarious world where the values of 
their homes are less than the outstanding balances on their mortgages.
2
  These 
families are living underwater. Many of them continue to pay and remain current 
on their mortgages despite extenuating economic circumstances.  But increasingly, 
more and more families cannot continue to pay their inflated mortgage premiums 
and are at risk of defaulting and entering the foreclosure process. 
 There are more than 60,000 underwater mortgages in New York City, which 
is almost 12% of all NYC homeowners.
3
  New York City has the seventh-highest 
number of underwater homes in the country,
 4
 and the collective value of these 
underwater mortgages exceeds $13 billion.
5
 Because the banks and government 
                                                        
1 Zillow Real Estate Research, Q1 2014 data, 
http://www.zillow.com/research/data/ 
2 American Community Survey 5 year Estimates, 2008-2012, Social Explorer, 
http://www.zillow.com/research/data/; Zillow supra. 
3 Zillow supra. 
4 Negative Equity Report, Zillow, May 2012. 
5 Zillow supra. 
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have not effectively helped underwater homeowners, the city lost $1.9 billion in 
property taxes and other expenses associated with vacant properties from 2008-13.
6
 
 Over 24,000 of the underwater mortgages in New York are private-label 
securitized (PLS) mortgages.
7
 These are primarily high-interest, subprime 
mortgages that investment banks bundled and sold on the secondary market to 
investors, leading to the economic collapse of 2008. PLS mortgages are also the 
hardest to modify in a sustainable way, with a variety of complex and hastily 
drafted service and trust agreements that typically prevent servicers from reducing 
principal for homeowners.  
 In particular, the concentration of underwater PLS loans are at epidemic 
levels in African-American and Latino neighborhoods. Seventeen of the 20 zip codes 
with the highest number of PLS mortgages have populations that are more than 
50% African American and/or Latino; seven of the 10 zip codes with the highest 
number of PLS mortgages have populations that are more than 90% African 
American and or Latino.
8
   
Recommendations 
1. Loan holders — banks, government-sponsored enterprises (Fannie, Freddie and 
FHFA), and PLS trusts that pool loans and send proceeds to investors — must 
reduce the principal on underwater mortgages to reflect current market values; if 
loan holders are unwilling or unable to reduce principal on underwater mortgages 
to current market values, they should allow loans to be purchased by a designated 
entities (preferably not-for-profit or government entities) that are willing and able 
to restructure them with fair and affordable terms. 
 
                                                        
6 How the Foreclosure Crisis is Costing New York City Millions, New York Communities 
for Change, Mutual Association of Housing New York, April 2013, 
salsa.wiredforchange.com/.../nycc%20how%20the%20foreclosure%20cri 
7 PLS source. 
8 PLS data supra; American Community Survey supra. 
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2. The City should use all options at its disposal to induce principal reduction so that 
mortgage debts match current home values, including utilizing the tool of 
“eminent domain” to acquire mortgages in PLS trusts at their current fair market 
value and restructuring them with fair and affordable terms. 
 
3. Banks; government-sponsored enterprises like Fannie, Freddie and its conservator 
FHFA; and PLS trusts should sell foreclosed property to not-for-profit entities 
that can convert them to affordable housing for community residents rather than 
to absentee investors for speculative purposes.  This is what “land banks” in many 
states are doing with success. 
 
 
Introduction – the underwater mortgage crisis 
 
“Underwater” homes are those homes where the value of the mortgage exceeds 
the current market value of the home.  Depressed home prices coupled with economic 
downturn and the loss of jobs has left thousands of homeowners unable to pay their 
mortgages at current rates and has left even more in the position where what they owe far 
exceeds the current value of their homes. 
Despite claims of a national housing recovery, disaggregating the NYC data 
shows that there are thousands of homeowners, particularly in African-American, Latino 
and low- and moderate- income communities, whose home values have not increased.  
These homeowners are still far underwater, struggling to make payments and either 
already in foreclosure or at risk of soon going into foreclosure.  Data also shows an 
increased probability that underwater mortgages, even those where homeowners are 
current on their mortgage payments, will go into default and risk foreclosure in coming 
months and years. 
THE PROBLEM is exacerbated for a specific loan type.  There are three basic 
mortgage types: a first group of loans underwritten and held in a bank’s portfolio; a 
second group of loans underwritten and held by government and quasi-government 
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entities like Fannie, Freddie and FHA; and a third set of loans, “private-label securitized,” 
which investment banks bundled and sold to investors.  The majority of the PLS 
mortgages are subprime, Alt-A and other unconventional loans – precisely the kinds of 
predatory loans originated during the housing bubble that are now the most likely to be 
underwater or in foreclosure.  Many of the sources drawn upon to analyze the PLS 
problem refer to sub-prime loans and while all sub-prime loans are not PLS loans there is 
so much overlap that the two terms could be used almost interchangeably. 
Subprime mortgages are much more likely than conventional prime loans to go 
into foreclosure.
9
  These subprime mortgage products were targeted to African-American 
and Latino communities,
10
 which helps explain why the foreclosure crisis has impacted 
these neighborhoods more heavily than other areas of the city, and why most people with 
PLS loans live in those neighborhoods.  Not only are PLS loans clustered in areas with 
high numbers of foreclosures, they are also twice as likely as non-PLS to be underwater. 
Although modifications have been slow in coming in all loan categories, the most 
difficult to modify are PLS mortgages. This is due in part to the way these PLS loans 
were packaged after origination, leaving them subject to pooling and servicing 
agreements that, according to the trustees, typically prohibit or effectively prevent 
principal reduction modification.
11
   
                                                        
9 Gerardi, K., Shapiro, A., and Willen, P., Subprime outcomes: Risky Mortgages, 
Homeownership Experiences, and Foreclosures, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 
Working Paper 07-15, 2007; Gerardi, Chirstopher, Paul S. Willen, Subprime 
Mortgages, Foreclosures, and Urban Neighborhoods, Public Policy Discussion Papers, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 12/2008 
10 Id. 
11 Hockett, Robert.  Breaking the Mortgage Debt Impasse: Municipal Condemnation 
Proceedings and Public / Private Partnerships for Mortgage Loan Modification, Value 
Preservation, and Local Economic Recovery.   
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In fact, many people, including servicers and trustees, argue that modifying PLS 
mortgages is nearly impossible. While the single best, well- documented solution for 
homeowners who are trying to stay in their homes is a principal reduction modification 
(reducing the current mortgage amount to current market value and restructuring the 
mortgage payments to keep the home occupied by its original owner), it is often 
impossible to implement due to the structural obstacles of the PLS mortgage pools — 
even when agreed upon by the investors themselves.
12
 
Of all the potential solutions outlined in our recommendations, eminent domain is 
the cleanest most direct way to release these PLS loans from their structural confinement 
and allow for loan modifications, which would result in homeowner home retainment and 
neighborhood stabilization.  
 Outside of Manhattan and a few areas in Brooklyn, values are only expected to 
rise by a little more than 1% in 2014,
13
 and the average underwater PLS mortgage is 
roughly 30% underwater in New York City.  Coupled with the heightened probability 
that underwater mortgages will go into foreclosure in the future and the downward effect 
of foreclosures on nearby home prices, it will be nearly impossible for home values in 
areas with large numbers of underwater PLS mortgages to increase in value by 30% in 
the foreseeable future.
14
 
                                                        
12 Id. 
13 Zillow Real Estate Research, New York Metro area predicted increase in 2014 is 
1.4%, http://www.zillow.com/new-york-metro-ny_r394913/home-values/; New 
York City expected increase in 2013 is 3.1% http://www.zillow.com/new-york-
ny/home-values/; New York State expected increase in 2014 is 1.2%. 
14 Home value increases in NYC are skewed by Manhattan’s 17.4% property 
increase in 2013.  In the Bronx, values declined; Staten Island property values were 
stagnant in 2013; increases in Queens were modest; and Brooklyn’s increases are to 
skewed by large increases in neighborhoods closest to Manhattan. 
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Key Findings 
 An examination of PLS mortgages in New York City reveals that PLS 
mortgages are more likely to be underwater, more likely to go into foreclosure, and 
more heavily concentrated in African-American, Hispanic, and moderate-income 
communities.  There is no way to address the foreclosure crisis in neighborhoods of 
color without fixing PLS mortgages. 
Table 1: Delinquent, Underwater, and PLS Mortgages Compared to Total 
Mortgages 
 
Total Mortgages 483,000 100% of mortgages 
PLS Mortgages 72,365 15% of mortgages 
Total Delinquent Mortgages 48,300 10% of mortgages 
Delinquent PLS Mortgages 24,460 51% of delinquent mortgages 
Total Underwater 60,303 15.7% of mortgages 
Underwater PLS Mortgages 24,214 40% of underwater mortgages 
PLS Mortgages Underwater 
and Delinquent 
12,203 50% of underwater PLS 
mortgages 
 
PLS mortgages are more likely than conventional mortgages to default.   
 6% of total mortgages are in foreclosure compared to 20% of PLS mortgages 
 10% of total mortgages are delinquent compared to 34% of PLS mortgages. 
 Less than 15% of total mortgages are underwater compared to 33% of PLS 
mortgages.  
 
Even though PLS mortgages constitute a relatively small percentage of total 
mortgages, a large percentage of both foreclosed and/or underwater mortgages are 
PLS.   
 15% of mortgages are PLS. 
 50% of mortgages in foreclosure are PLS. 
 50% of mortgages that are delinquent are PLS. 
 40% of underwater mortgages are PLS.  
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The impact of the foreclosure crisis has been felt most acutely in African-American 
and Latino Communities, and PLS mortgages are heavily concentrated in African-
American and Latino neighborhoods. 
 18 of the 20 zip codes with the highest number of foreclosures in New York 
City have populations that are more than 50% African American and/or 
Latino.   
 19 of the 20 zip codes with the highest number of REO15 properties have 
populations that are more than 50% African American and or Latino. 
 
Indications of continuing crisis are strongest in African-American and Latino 
communities 
 13 of the 20 zip codes with the highest number of underwater PLS mortgages 
have populations that are more than 50% African American and or Latino. 
 19 of the 20 zip codes with the highest number of PLS mortgages have 
populations that are more than 50% African American and or Latino. 
 19 of the 20 zip codes with the highest number of underwater mortgages 
have populations that are more than 50% African American and or Latino 
 
Methods 
This report uses zip code-level data on PLS loans for the five boroughs – data 
purchased from Lewtan, a large experienced data and analytics provider to the 
securitization marketplace –  to show where the PLS mortgages are concentrated, what 
their loan-to-value ratios are, and how they are currently performing.  The total number 
of mortgages and number delinquent is as reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, and the total underwater mortgage numbers come from Zillow.  Foreclosure and 
REO figures come from RealtyTrac.  Various scholarly articles are drawn from to show 
trends related to PLS and subprime mortgages and to support recommendations made by 
this report.  Demographic data came from the American Community Survey. 
  
                                                        
15
 REO (Real Estate Owned) is a term used to describe properties that went through the 
foreclosure process and are now vacant and owned by the mortgagor. 
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Signs of a Continuing Crisis 
 New York City has been heavily impacted by the foreclosure crisis.  Since the 
foreclosure crisis began in 2008, there have been nearly 100,000 foreclosures in New 
York City
16
 and the percentage of mortgages that are in foreclosure has been increasing 
since 2004.
17
  Nationally, about 2%
18
 of mortgages are in foreclosure, but in New York 
City 6% are in foreclosure.
19
 New York City’s foreclosure rate, in other words, is three 
times the national average. Corelogic reports that New York State has the third-highest 
percentage of its homes currently in foreclosure, exceeded by only New Jersey and 
Florida.
20
  In New York City, foreclosures are up 15% in 2014.
21
  Hopes that the housing 
market is healing on its own, especially in New York, are overly optimistic. 
The large number of mortgages that are currently delinquent and/or underwater 
indicates that the foreclosure crisis is far from over in New York City.  One in 10, or 
48,300, of the city’s 483,000 mortgage are past due.22 Over 60,000 mortgages are 
currently underwater.
23
  
Across all types of mortgages and borrower FICO scores, the strongest indicator 
of whether or not a homeowner will default on his or her mortgage is the equity position; 
as equity decreases, the probability of default increases.
24
  Homeowners that are 
                                                        
16
 RealtyTrac. 
17
 Regional Mortgage Briefs supra; see also Klein, Jeffery D., Foreclosure’s Persistent Threat to 
New York City and its Minority Communities, The New York State Senate, June 9
th
 2014. 
18 National Foreclosure Report, Corelogic, May 2014. 
19 Foreclosure’s Persistent Threat to New York City and Its Minority Communities 
supra; Regional Mortgage Briefs supra. 
20
 Corelogic, National Foreclosure Report supra.. 
21 Foreclosure’s Persistent Threat supra. 
22
 Id. 
23
 Zillow, Negative Equity Report, 05/2014 
24
 Goodman, Lori S., Roger Ashworth, Brain Landy, Lidan Yang.  The Case For Principal 
Reductions.  The Journal of Structured Finance 2011.17.3:29-41. Downloaded from 
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underwater (in a negative-equity position) are at risk of foreclosure because the home, 
which has historically been the bedrock of many people’s savings, has become a liability 
rather than an asset.  There is a 90% probability that homeowners who are both 
delinquent and underwater will transition into foreclosure.
25
  A homeowner struggling to 
stay current on mortgage payments who has equity could historically sell or refinance in 
order to avoid a default, but these are options households with negative equity don’t 
have.
26
   These delinquent and underwater mortgages could almost double the weight of 
the foreclosure burden already borne by the city.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                     
www.iijournals.com; see also Foote, Chistopher, Kristopher Gerardi, Lorenz Goette, Paul Willen, 
Reducing Foreclosures; No Easy Answers, National Bureau of Economic Research, University of 
Chicago Press, April 2010.  
25
 Id. at 31. 
26
 Gerardi, Kristopher S, Paul S. Willen, Subprime Mortgages, Foreclosures, and Urban 
Neighborhoods, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, No. 08-6, 12-22-2008, page 17. 
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Economic Impact on Homeowners, Adjacent Homeowners, and Neighborhoods 
 The foreclosure crisis has already cost the city approximately $1.9 billion in 
expenses and lost real estate tax revenue.
27
  Foreclosures cost the city money in two 
ways. First, foreclosures cause property-tax revenues to decline as property values erode 
and second, many properties that enter the foreclosure process end up as vacant, bank-
owned properties that result in significantly increased maintenance costs to the city.    
Table 2: The Cost of Foreclosures 
Source of cost Loss in value 
per property 
Cost per 
property 
Number of 
properties 
Total Cost 
Property Tax 
loss from 
foreclosed 
properties 
-20% $844 95,961 $81 million 
Property Tax 
loss from 
surrounding 
homes 
-1% $42 40.1 million
28
 
 
$1.7 billion 
REO properties   $19,277 7,341 $141.5 million 
 
 When a property goes into foreclosure its value is reduced by roughly 20%,
29
 and 
values of properties within an eighth of a mile of a foreclosed property go down by 1%.
30
 
                                                        
27 How the Foreclosure Crisis Cost New York City Million, New York Communities for 
Change & Mutual Housing Association of New York, 2013, 
salsa.wiredforchange.com/.../nycc%20how%20the%20foreclosure%20cri... 
28 Each foreclosure reduces the value of every home within an eighth of a mile by 
1%.  Many homes have been affected multiple times so rather than saying 40.1 
million homes have been effected, there have been 40.1 million instances of 
foreclosures reducing the value of nearby properties.  
29
 Pennington-Cross, Anthony.  The Value of Foreclosed Property.  Journal of Real-estate 
Research, Volume 28, No. 2.  (April-June 2006); see also W. Scott Fame.  Estimating the 
Effects of Foreclosures on Nearby Property Values; A Critical Review of the Literature.  
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review, Volume 95,  November 2010.  
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Assuming a median home value of $422,000
31
 the resulting loss of real-estate value totals 
$177.3 billion.  Using New York City’s average property-tax rate for residential property 
of approximately 1%
32
 this leads to a loss of nearly $1.8 billion in property tax revenue 
since the inception of the crisis.  
There are rarely third-party buyers at foreclosure auctions so most properties that 
complete the foreclosure process end up bank owned (known as REO).
33
  These 
properties nearly always become vacant.
34
 Absent a fire, the cost of REOs to the local 
government of a large city is likely to be around $19,277,
35
 which totals to $141.1 million 
for the 7,341 properties that have become REO since 2008.   
 Failure to act to stave off the impending wave of foreclosures anticipated by the 
large number of delinquent and underwater mortgages will drastically increase costs to 
the city due to foreclosures and related negative impact. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
30
 Immergluck, Dan and Geoff Smith.  The External Cost of Foreclosure: The Impact of 
Single-Familiy Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values.  Housing Policy Debate, 
Volume 17, Issue 1.  2006; see also Schuetz, Jenny, Vicki Been, and Inrgid Gould Ellen.  
Neighborhood Effects of Concentrated Mortgage Foreclosures.  Journal of Housing 
Economics, Volume 17, 306-319.  2008.  
31
 Zillow Real Estate Research. (Median homevalues are higher now, but 422K represents mid-
crisis values) 
32
 http://www.nyc.gov/html/dof/html/property/property_bill_calculate.shtml  
33
 Immergluck 2010, page 8.  Citing; Cutts, A. C., and W. Merrill. 2008. Interventions in 
mortgage default: Policies and practices to prevent home loss and lower costs. In 
Borrowing to live: Consumer and mortgage credit revisited, edited by N. Retsinas and E. 
Belsky, 203–54. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 
34
 Immergluck 2010, page 8.  Also, Whitaker, Stephen.  Foreclosure Related Vacancy 
Rates.  Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland; Economic Commentary.  July, 2012. Page 
1; See also Rao, J., and G. Walsh. 2009. Foreclosing a dream: State laws deprive 
homeowners of basic protections. Boston: National Consumer Law Center. 
http://www.nclc.org/ issues/foreclosure/content/FORE-Report0209.pdf (accessed 
November 24, 2009). 
35
 Apgar, William C., Mark Duda, and Rochelle Nawrocki Gorey.  The Municipal Cost of 
Foreclosure: A Chicago Case Study.  Homeownership Preservation Foundation.  
February 2005.  Pages 24-27. 
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A Small Percentage of Total Mortgages are Causing a Big Part of the Problem 
  An examination of PLS mortgage data in New York City reveals four important 
trends with regard to the ongoing foreclosure crisis.   
1.  In New York City, PLS mortgages are three-times more likely to be delinquent or 
in foreclosure than other mortgages and twice as likely to be underwater.  There 
are approximately 483,000 mortgages in New York City,
36
 of which 
approximately 72,000 (15%) are PLS.  6% of all mortgages are in foreclosure, and 
10% of all mortgages are delinquent. In comparison, 20% of PLS mortgages are 
in foreclosure and 34% are delinquent.  Furthermore, approximately 12% of all 
mortgages are underwater as compared with 33% of PLS mortgages.  These 
findings are consistent with other studies that have compared the performance of 
subprime mortgages to conventional prime mortgages and found that subprime 
mortgages were 5-7 times more likely to default than conventional loans were.
37
 
2. PLS mortgages comprise less than 15% of all New York City mortgages; 
however, they represent essentially half of the mortgages that are delinquent or in 
foreclosure and nearly one third of all underwater mortgages.  There are 
approximately 29,000 mortgages in foreclosure in New York City, of which 50% 
(14,779) are PLS.  There are approximately 48,000 mortgages delinquent 
                                                        
36 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Regional Mortgage Briefs, 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/regionalmortgagebriefs/index.html 
37 Gerardi, K., Shapiro, A., and Willen, P., Subprime outcomes: Risky Mortgages, 
Homeownership Experiences, and Foreclosures, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 
Working Paper 07-15, 2007; Gerardi, Chirstopher, Paul S. Willen, Subprime 
Mortgages, Foreclosures, and Urban Neighborhoods, Public Policy Discussion Papers, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 12/2008 
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citywide and half of them (24,460) are PLS.  Over 60,000 mortgages in NYC are 
underwater and 40% (24,214) of them are PLS.   
3. PLS mortgages are heavily concentrated in African-American and Latino 
neighborhoods, resulting in the disparate impact of foreclosures, delinquent loans 
and vacant properties affecting African-American and Latino homeowners.  
Several studies show that subprime mortgages have a tendency to be clustered in 
low-income and minority communities.
38
  The 239 New York City zip codes 
examined for this report support these findings. Seventeen of the 20 zip codes 
with the highest number of PLS mortgages had populations that were more than 
50% African American and/or Latino, and seven of the 10 zip codes with the 
highest number of PLS mortgages had populations that were more than 90% 
African-American and/or Latino. The disproportionate number of PLS mortgages 
that were originated for homes in minority communities directly correlates with 
the facts that African-American households are more than three times more likely 
and Latino households are more than twice as likely as white households to 
experience foreclosure.
39
 
4. PLS mortgages are disproportionately concentrated in low- and moderate-income 
neighborhoods. Twelve of the 20 zip codes with the greatest number of PLS 
mortgages have median incomes below the $59,000 median income
40
 for the zip 
                                                        
38 Subprime Mortgages, Foreclosures, and Urban Neighborhoods supra at 3; see also 
Immergluck, Dan, Geoff Smith, The Impact of Single-family Mortgage Foreclosures on 
Neighborhood Crime, Housing Studies, Vol. 21, No. 6, 851-66, 853, November 2006; 
Mayer, Christopher J., Karen Pence, Subprime Mortgages: What, Where, and to 
Whom?, page 2, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008. 
39 Subprime Mortgages, Foreclosures, and Urban Neighborhoods supra at 17. 
40 American Community Survey, 2008-2013 5 year estimates. 
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codes examined.  Fourteen of the 20 zip codes with the greatest percentages of 
underwater PLS mortgages have median incomes is below the study median.   
Specific New York City Hot Spots 
 Foreclosures, underwater mortgages, and PLS mortgages are clustered in certain 
parts of the city.  In each borough, the highest concentration of underwater PLS loans are 
in African-American and Latino neighborhoods.  Many of these mortgages are deeply – 
more than 25% – underwater, making it very likely that these homeowners will default 
and enter foreclosure before regaining equity in the property.  In particular, the 
neighborhoods of East Brooklyn, Southeast Queens, the Northeast Bronx and the North 
Shore of Staten Island have high numbers of PLS mortgages, a high percentage of which 
are underwater. 
 Because we know that African-American and Latino homeowners were targeted 
with subprime loans,
41
 it is logical that these neighborhoods would have the greatest 
number of PLS mortgages that are underwater.  The only way to help these homeowners 
and save these neighborhoods is for local government to take bold action and step in 
where the federal government and banking institutions have failed on their own.
                                                        
41 Schwartztol, Larry. Predatory Lending: Wall Street Profited, Minority Families Paid 
the Price. The American Civil Liberties Union. September 16, 2011 
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Table 3: Most Underwater PLS Mortgages by Queens Neighborhood 
Neighborhood Zip Code % African-
American/Latino 
# of PLS 
Mortgages 
# of underwater 
PLS Mortgages 
LTV of More than 
125% 
Springfield Gardens/ 
St Albans 
11434 95% 1,490 796 466 
Brookville/ 
Laurelton 
11413 96% 1,431 642 265 
St. Albans 11412 94% 1,277 624 277 
South Ozone Park 11420 51% 1,116 579 280 
Jamaica 11433 87% 882 524 311 
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Table 4: Most Underwater PLS Mortgages by Brooklyn Neighborhood 
Neighborhood Zip Code % African-
American/Latino 
# of PLS 
Mortgages 
# of underwater 
PLS Mortgages 
LTV of More than 
125% 
Canarsie 11236 92% 2,478 1,134 444 
East New York 11208 90% 1,719 962 549 
East New York 11207 95% 1,567 719 339 
East Flatbush 11203 94% 1,503 679 333 
Bergen Beach/ Old 
Mill Basin 
11234 52% 1,848 659 224 
 
Table 5: Most Underwater PLS Mortgages by Neighborhoods in the Bronx 
Neighborhood Zip Code % African-
American/Latino 
# of PLS 
Mortgages 
# of underwater 
PLS Mortgages 
LTV of More than 
125% 
Pelham Gardens 10469 79% 1,352 689 293 
North Baychester 10466 94% 1,289 566 246 
Norwood 10467 67% 611 265 135 
18 
 
East Chester Bay 10465 43% 688 256 82 
Soundview 10472 89% 540 256 104 
 
Table 6: Most Underwater PLS Mortgages by Staten Island Neighborhoods 
Neighborhood Zip Code % African-
American/Latino 
# of PLS 
Mortgages 
# of underwater 
PLS Mortgages 
LTV of More than 
125% 
Mariners Harbor 10303 72% 677 426 225 
Bulls Head/ 
Westerleigh 
10314 17% 1,156 355 107 
Huguennot/ Arden 
Heights 
10312 10% 921 253 61 
New Dorp/  
Midland Beach 
10306 16% 729 244 92 
Stapleton/Clifton 10304 52% 711 239 107 
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Impact in Neighborhoods Affected by Hurricane Sandy 
 There are also thousands of families with underwater PLS mortgages who live in 
neighborhoods affected by Superstorm Sandy.  Not only did many of these families lose 
income as they missed work and lost tenants in the aftermath of the storm, they also 
incurred tens of thousands of dollars of damage to their homes.  Thousands of 
homeowners were already struggling and underwater before the storm hit, making the 
increased costs of repairs and insurance a tipping point.   
 After Sandy, banks suspended mortgage payments for homeowners – but these 
were not indefinite.  And these suspensions in some cases turned out to be more 
problematic than helpful for some families, as lump sum payments were required after 
the moratorium ended.  We know from past disaster experiences – like Hurricane Katrina 
in New Orleans – that when the moratoriums end and insurance premiums rise, there is 
an influx of foreclosure and mass displacement.
42
 
 In neighborhoods like Far Rockaway, Canarsie, Midland Beach and Bergen 
Beach specifically, homeowners are in danger of losing their homes, and as a result there 
is a real threat that the economic and racial demographics of many Sandy affected 
neighborhoods will change completely.  A total of 4,228 families have a PLS mortgage 
that is underwater in zip codes hit by Superstorm Sandy. 
  
                                                        
42 Travers, Suzanne Canarsie Braces for Foreclosure Wave after Sandy, City Limits, 19 
February 2013 
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Table 7: Underwater PLS Loans in Sandy-Affected Queens Neighborhoods 
 Neighborhood Zip Code Underwater PLS Mortgages 
Springfield Gardens 11413 642 
Howard Beach 11414 161 
Far Rockaway 11691 411 
Arverne 11692 166 
Broad Channel 11693 53 
Rockaway Beach 11694 64 
Total  1,497 
 
Table 8: Underwater PLS Loans in Sandy-Affected Brooklyn Neighborhoods 
Neighborhood Zip Code Underwater PLS Mortgages 
Coney Island 11224 48 
Gerritsen /Sheepshead 11229 114 
Red Hook 11231 5 
Sunset Park 11232 17 
Bergen Beach/Mill Basin 11234 659 
Brighton Beach/Sheepshead 11235 210 
Canarsie 11236 1,134 
Total  2,187 
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Table 9: Underwater PLS Loans in Sandy-Affected Staten Island Neighborhoods 
Neighborhood Zip Code Underwater PLS Mortgage 
South Beach 10305 188 
New Dorp/Midland 10306 244 
Great Kills 10308 112 
Total  544 
 
Principal Reduction Modification to Prevent Foreclosures 
According to economic experts, lenders would lose less money if they were to 
grant principal reduction mortgage modifications to underwater PLS mortgages, but 
structural factors prevent them from doing so, which makes government action necessary.  
When a homeowner defaults on a mortgage, the choice for investors is to foreclose or 
modify.  Legal fees, maintenance of the property, and selling costs that go along with 
foreclosing on a property can cost investors anywhere from 49-75% of the unpaid 
mortgage balance.
43
  In many cases, the investor would lose less if a borrower were given 
a principal-reduction modification than the same investor would lose by foreclosing.
44
 
However, there are many entrenched barriers preventing a wide-ranging program of 
principal write-downs. 
Principal reduction modifications are the only way to truly heal the real estate 
market. As securities, mortgage-ownership interests are fragmented in such a way that 
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makes it nearly impossible for investors to modify loans within their current structure.
45
  
Collection authority for these securitized mortgages is entrusted to an agent known as the 
servicer, and mortgages entrusted to a servicer are subject to pooling and servicing 
agreements that often prohibit modification.
46
 Furthermore compensation to servicers is 
often structured to be independent of borrower principal payments so that it is more 
profitable for servicers to proceed with a foreclosure even if that isn’t what is better for 
the investors.
47
 
And despite evidence that a large-scale principal reduction program targeting PLS 
mortgages would be in the best interests of investors, there is no indication in the 
marketplace that this notion is getting traction.  No investor wants to be first to initiate 
such a program because as mortgages are modified and foreclosures are prevented home 
values will start to increase, the result being that the last to initiate principal reduction 
modifications has to reduce principal the least.
48
  Since the trustees and investors are 
either unwilling or unable on their own behest to rewrite many mortgages with 
principal reduction, local government must go around obstacles to action, inducing 
and coordinating a robust mortgage-modification effort that targets precisely those 
mortgages that are most at risk of going into foreclosure.  
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New York City Can Compel Principal Reduction Modifications 
City government can use the power of eminent domain to: 
1. Purchase existing PLS mortgages at fair market value.  
2. Rewrite these mortgages so that the new mortgage balances are equal to or less 
than the homes’ current values.   
 The power of eminent domain allows the city to take ownership of private 
property (in this case mortgages, not homes) if it serves a public purpose and the 
private owners are paid fair market value for the taken property.
49
 In many cities, a 
plan has been considered in which those cities, in partnership with private investors, 
would purchase underwater mortgages (the loan; not the actual home) for the fair 
market value. By using eminent domain the city can write underwater PLS mortgages 
down to current market values, preventing the loss of billions of taxpayer dollars and 
creating an enormous economic stimulus for the city.  
There are several ways the city can design such a program, including hiring a 
company to manage the process and lining up private capital for the mortgage purchases. 
This could be the cheapest option for the city, but there are other ways this can be 
financed, and the city could develop its own program.
50
  After purchasing the mortgages, 
the city will work with partners, including HUD-approved loan counselors, to modify or 
refinance mortgages.  .  
Robert Hockett, a Professor at Cornell Law School, has analyzed the legal 
ramifications of New York City utilizing eminent domain to seize underwater mortgages 
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and concluded it is within the power of the city to do so without any state action.  He 
identified language in State Constitution, Article XVIII, Section 9 and the state’s Eminent 
Domain Procedure Law Sections 101, 103, 104, and 708 indicating that the city could use 
eminent domain, without further state action, to seize underwater mortgages for the 
public purpose of preventing blight and neighborhood decline so long as the holders of 
the mortgages are paid the fair market value of those mortgages.
51
  
It falls on local government to address the foreclosure crisis.  Many of the 
foreclosure initiatives advanced by both the Bush and Obama Administrations have not 
had an impact because they failed to reach a significant number of homeowners and 
didn’t address the issues of negative-equity.52  Significant future action by the federal 
government is unlikely because 1) Congress is so ideologically divided and 2) local 
governments feel the negative effects of foreclosures most acutely.
53
 Therefore, the 
willingness of New York City’s government to act on foreclosures is essential for 
underwater homeowners and the neighborhoods where they live. 
Principal Reduction Modifications Will Stimulate the Economy 
 After inducing the principal and interest-rate mortgage modifications that will 
lower mortgage loan payments, the city would see an economic stimulus in the 
neighborhoods with the highest concentration of previously underwater PLS mortgages.  
Because homeowners would spend the additional money they had each month, there 
would be an annual stimulus of almost $300 million if the principal balance and interest 
rates of all of the city’s underwater PLS mortgages were modified to reflect current home 
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values and interest rates.  That would result in the creation of more than 4,400 jobs.  If 
the principal balance of every underwater PLS mortgage in NYC were reduced to 100% 
of the homes’ value and the interest rates were reduced to slightly above the going rate, 
homeowners would save $1,578 a month, a total of $450 million annually.  
         Cash-strapped homeowners would likely spend most of the payment savings 
creating a direct consumer-spending driven stimulus to the city’s economy.54 The 
payments would function similarly to the tax cuts for personal consumption used by the 
federal government in 2008 to stimulate the economy.  The New York Times reported that 
consumer spending was elevated in the months following the 2008 stimulus.
55
  
Consumers spent 50-90% of their 2008 economic stimulus payments on durable or 
nondurable goods.
56
  Many underwater homeowners are currently struggling to make 
their payments; a modification that lowers their payments would have the same economic 
impact as receiving a check in the mail.  
In addition to curbing defaults by easing payment pressures and removing the 
strategic incentive to walk away, such a modification program would increase consumer 
spending, thus stimulating the economy and leading to job creation.  Payments savings 
spent by homeowners could create over 4,400 jobs.  It has been estimated that it takes 
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$68,493 to create one job through tax cuts for personal consumption.
57
  Since mortgage-
payment reductions act like a tax cut for personal consumption, about 70% of payment 
savings, would flow directly into the city’s economy.   Modifications would lower 
payments and increase consumer spending, allowing businesses to create jobs.   
 
Conclusion 
  The foreclosure crisis has hit New York City with a ferocity equal to if not greater 
than that felt by the majority of the United States, and large numbers of delinquent and 
underwater mortgages indicate that the crisis is not over.  Foreclosures have already cost 
the city hundreds of millions of dollars, and if the city does not act now to prevent 
existing delinquent and/or underwater mortgages from going into foreclosure, the cost to 
the city will increase dramatically.  As documented above, a small percentage of total 
mortgages are causing a grossly disproportionate percentage of the problem with the most 
substantial impact to African-American and or Latino homeowners.  Principal reduction 
modifications are necessary to turn the tide and to prevent an on-going crisis.  The result 
would include less foreclosures, economic stimulus, and job creation.  New York City 
has the power to bring banks and investors to the table to negotiate the purchase of PLS 
mortgages.  If lenders are not willing to engage in this pragmatic, financially astute 
solution, the city has the power to use eminent domain to purchase the underwater 
mortgages at fair market value and provide the necessary principle reduction 
modifications that will help homeowners, lenders and neighborhoods.. 
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Appendix A. Top 20 Tables 
20 Zip Codes w/ the Greatest Number of PLS 
Mortgages 
 
Zip PLS % Minority Median Income Neighborhood 
11236 2478 92% 
60,758 
Carnarsie 
11234 1848 52% 
68,177 
Flatlands 
11208 1719 90% 35,665 Cypress Hill 
11207 1567 95% 32,642 East New York 
11203 1506 94% 
49,002 
East Flatbush 
11434 1490 95% 
57,393 
Jamaica 
(springfield 
gardens) 
11413 1431 96% 
77,739 
Laurelton 
10469 1352 79% 
55,724 
Baychester 
10466 1289 94% 44,038 Wakefield 
11412 1277 94% 
71,292 
Saint Albans 
(Hollis) 
11221 1230 91% 
37,608 
Bushwick 
11368 1205 82% 46,325 Corona 
10314 1156 17% 79,820 Willowbrook 
11422 1121 91% 85,151 Rosedale 
11420 1116 51% 
60,603 
South Ozone 
Park 
10302 922 59% 
56,883 
Elm Park 
10312 921 10% 87,426 Eltingville 
11233 919 95% 
35,620 
Ocean Hill 
11433 882 87% 
43,419 
Jamaica 
11419 879 34% 53,815 Richmond Hill 
 
28 
 
 
20 Zip Codes w/ the Greatest Number of Underwater PLS 
Mortgages 
Zip UW PLS % Minority 
Median 
Income Neighborhood 
11236 1134 92% 60,758 Richmond Hill 
11208 962 90% 
35,665 
Cypress Hill 
11434 796 95% 
57,393 
Jamaica 
(Springfield 
Gardens) 
11207 719 95% 32,642 East New York 
10469 689 79% 55,724 Baychester 
11203 679 94% 49,002 East Flatbush 
11234 659 52% 68,177 Flatlands 
11413 642 96% 77,739 Lauelton 
11412 624 94% 
71,292 
Saint Albans 
(Hollis) 
11420 579 51% 
60,603 
South Ozone Park 
10466 566 94% 44,038 Wakefield 
11433 524 87% 43,419 Jamaica  
11422 493 91% 85,151 Rosedale 
11221 465 91% 
37,608 
Bushwick 
11421 437 62% 57,091 Woodhaven 
10303 426 72% 
50,137 
Mariners Harbor 
11419 412 34% 53,815 Richmond Hill 
11692 411 84% 39,817 Arverne 
11368 399 82% 46,325 Corona 
11212 394 97% 27,901 Brownsville 
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20 Zip Codes w/ the Greatest Number of  Underwater Mortgages 
 
Zip CCD UW % Minority Median Income Neighborhood 
11434 27 1776 95% 
57,393 
Jamaica 
(Springfield 
Gardens) 
10314 50 1453 17% 79,820 New Springville 
11234 46 1409 52% 68,177 Flatlands 
10469 12 1373 79% 
55,724 Baychester 
11412 27 1271 94% 
71,292 
St Albans 
(Hollis) 
10466 15 1266 94% 44,038 Wakefield 
11203 45 1220 94% 49,002 East Flatbush 
11413 31 1215 96% 
77,739 
Springfield 
Gardens 
10462 15 1207 72% 
46,001 Morris Park 
11420 33 1063 51% 
60,603 
South Ozone 
Park 
10303 49 1049 72% 
50,137 
Mariners 
Harbor 
11433 28 990 87% 
43,419 Jamaica 
10312 50 955 10% 
87,426 Eltingville 
10306 51 945 16% 
77,720 
Richmond 
Town 
10023 6 910 13% 105,311 Lincoln Square 
11435 28 904 56% 
53,914 
Jamaica 
(Briarwood) 
10465 13 887 43% 63,352 Throgs Neck 
10024 6 867 16% 110,091 
Upper 
Westside 
11422 31 853 91% 
85,151 Rosedale 
11419 28 838 34% 
53,815 Richmond Hill 
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20 Zip Codes w/ the Greatest Percentage of 
Underwater Mortgages 
Zip % UW 
% 
Minority 
Median 
Income Neighborhood 
11433 28% 87% 43,419 Jamaica 
10303 28% 72% 
50,137 
Mariners 
Harbor 
11436 27% 84% 60,820 Jamaica 
10462 27% 72% 46,001 Morris Park 
11434 24% 95% 
57,393 
Jamaica 
(Springfield 
Gardens) 
10470 22% 52% 56,058 Wakefield 
11412 22% 94% 
71,292 
Saint Albans 
(Hollis) 
10302 22% 59% 56,883 Elm Park 
11416 21% 47% 55,225 Woodhaven 
10466 20% 94% 44,038 Wakefield 
10459 20% 96% 21,913 Longwood 
11429 20% 89% 
70,478 
Queens 
Village 
10473 20% 95% 37,616 Soundview 
11435 20% 56% 53,914 Jamaica 
11411 19% 95% 
81,390 
Cambria 
Heights 
10469 18% 79% 55,724 Baychester 
11413 18% 96% 77,739 Laurelton 
11206 18% 68% 
28,584 
Bedford 
Stuyvesant 
11693 18% 53% 
50,006 
Far Rockaway 
(Broad 
Channel) 
11212 18% 97% 
27,901 Brownsville 
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20 Zip Codes w/ the Greatest Number of Foreclosures 
Zip Foreclosures 
% 
Minority 
Median 
Income Neighborhoods 
11208 2528 90% 35,665 Cypress Hills 
11207 2527 95% 
32,642 
East New York 
11236 2436 92% 
60,758 
East Flatbush 
11221 2335 91% 
37,608 
Bushwick 
11434 2007 95% 
57,393 
Jamaica (Springfield 
Gardens) 
11233 1999 95% 
35,620 
Ocean Hill 
11234 1785 52% 68,177 Flatlands 
11203 1688 94% 49,002 East Flatbush 
11412 1578 94% 
71,292 
Saint Albans (Hollis) 
10314 
1510 
17% 
79,820 
New Springville 
10466 1508 94% 
44,038 
Wakefield 
11433 1503 87% 
43,419 
Jamaica 
11420 1422 51% 
60,603 
South Ozone Park 
10469 1419 79% 
55,724 
Baychester 
11413 1405 96% 
77,739 
Laurelton 
11691 1319 73% 
38,631 
Far Rockaway 
10312 1216 10% 87,426 Eltingville 
10303 1163 72% 50,137 Mariners Harbor 
11216 1161 82% 41,688 Crown Heights 
11212 1100 97% 27,901 Brownsville 
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20 Zip Codes w/ the Greatest Number of REO 
Properties 
 
Zip REO % Minority 
Median 
Income Neighborhood 
11433 314 87% 43,419 Jamaica 
11434 293 95% 
57,393 
Jamaica 
(sprinfield 
gardens) 
11412 192 94% 
71,292 Saint Albans 
(Hollis) 
11691 192 73% 
38,631 
Far Rockaway 
11436 191 84% 60,820 Jamaica 
11420 181 51% 
60,603 
South Ozone 
Park 
11413 170 96% 77,739 Lauelton 
11233 158 95% 35,620 Ocean Hill 
11221 153 91% 
37,608 
Bushwick 
11207 151 95% 
32,642 
East New York 
11429 141 89% 
70,478 
Queens 
Village 
11421 132 62% 
57,091 
Woodhaven 
11208 123 90% 
35,665 
Cypress Hills 
11435 122 56% 
53,914 Jamaica 
(Briarwood) 
10303 119 72% 
50,137 
Mariners 
Harbor 
11422 116 91% 
85,151 
Rosedale 
10466 109 94% 44,038 Wakefield 
10301 105 48% 54,792 St. George 
11369 103 81% 55,553 Elmhurst 
10314 98 17% 79,820 Bloomfield 
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Borough 
Total PLS 
Mortgages 
100-110% 
LTV 
110-125% 
LTV 
125-150% 
LTV 
150-200% 
LTV > 200% LTV 
Queens 27,586 2,563 3,070 2,815 1,409 324 
Brooklyn 22,375 1,931 2,142 1,975 960 200 
Bronx 8858 1,007 1,206 1,152 413 96 
Staten 
Island 7335 773 815 641 297 64 
Manhattan 6211      
Total 72365 6274 7233 6583 3079 684 
 
